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Abstract
Stuart Murray's 'Care and the self: biotechnology, reproduction, and the good life' utilizes
Foucault's "care of the self" to examine health domains in its title. The present author discusses
three important articulations of concern with the Foucauldian concepts of care of the self that are
absent in the work of Murray and others: first, the voluntarism and individualism inherent in ideas
about care of the self; second, the absence of the interactional and relational; and, third, the
perpetuation of the interpretation of Foucault's concept of governmentality, 'the conduct of
conduct', as primarily coercive.
Commentary
"Something familiar, something peculiar, something for
everyone" is the promise of the opening number in
Stephen Sondheim's Broadway musical "A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Forum." And so it is with the
recent paper in this journal by Stuart Murray, 'Care and
the self: biotechnology, reproduction, and the good life'
[1]. We find here both the familiar and the peculiar in the
presentation of Foucault's 'care of the self'. But is there
something for everyone?
Stuart Murray's paper is to be welcomed for his discussion
of the potential for a Foucauldian inspired ethics follow-
ing ideas about 'care of the self'. There is little doubt that
a rethinking and reworking of the enlightenment subject
in bioethics is necessary. Indeed Murray is not alone in
presenting a critique of autonomy (see Frank [2], for a
review of critiques of autonomy that coalesce in the late
1990's) and suggesting a turn towards a Foucauldian eth-
ics (cf. McNay [3] and the special issue of Journal of Med-
ical Humanities [4]). Rather than establish the argument
for such an ethics, this commentator would have been
heartened by a progression of these ideas and an explora-
tion of how such an ethics could be enacted. Is it possible,
or desirable, that these ethics replace, enhance, or comple-
ment contemporary bioethics?
Murray's manuscript contains clues to a direction for a
Foucauldian ethics. The explication of the interaction of
Socrates with his student is an enticing injunction to come
to know one's self, to know "the relationship between the
self and itself, which includes the relation between the self
and others whose love and wisdom helps to bring that self
into a caring proximity with itself" [1]. Importantly, as
emphasized by Foucault, such knowledge of the self is not
without interaction beyond the self [5,6]. However, in the
process of presenting an argument for such a turn in bio-
medical ethics, the objects of criticism are insufficiently
drawn by Murray and we are left with the portrait of a uni-
dimensional world in which medicine and medics are
bad, the public dupes, and Foucault the solution. This
presentation leaves us in an uncomfortably disempow-
ered position as we are likely to be one or the other of
these subjects. Moreover, if critiques of modernism teach
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us anything it is that universalising constructs are not con-
ceptually or practically workable. Further, such a presenta-
tion logically precludes the engagement of a 'malign'
medicine and a 'passive' public in care of the self. We are
not therefore encouraged to engage with three important
concerns with the Foucauldian concepts in play in Mur-
ray's paper: particularly governmentality and care of the
self. These concerns include, the voluntarism and individ-
ualism inherent in ideas about care of the self, the absence
of the interactional and relational and, the perpetuation
of the interpretation of Foucault's concept of governmen-
tality, 'the conduct of conduct', as primarily coercive.
First, the concept of 'care of the self' used by Murray and
others is voluntaristic, one that enjoins the individual to
make of themselves a project and a place for reflection, to
engage in an 'aesthetics of the self'. This involves con-
scious and critical reflection on the social world and
engagement on one's own terms rather than those laid
down in advance as rules of conduct: an upending of
those rules and a creation, through active and thoughtful
reflection, of a new mode of conduct. A practical and eth-
ical anarchy, if you like. The outcome of such an ethics is
the opportunity for individuals to change their relation-
ship to the symbolic order; it is a way out of the con-
straints of socially constructed conceptions of, for
example, femininity and masculinity, and of "the other."
It does not, however, account for the material constraints
and the social circumstances that allow different opportu-
nities for individuals. In so doing it potentially reproduces
existing social inequalities; as, it must be noted, do many
approaches to addressing inequalities that favour the edu-
cated, articulate and materially fortunate of the populace.
Importantly, the 'care of the self' articulated through the
self promotes an ethics that in its individualism may fail
to account for the interaction of the individual in society;
for their responsibility within that society; and for the
effects of their lives upon that society. I have elsewhere
argued, after McNay [3] and Abrams [7], for a 'care of the
self' that is both generative and transformative. Generative
as an ethics in that its attentiveness to the symbolic and
material dimensions of the social world enables a
dynamic theory of agency which is capable of explaining
how individuals are able to act in creative and unantici-
pated ways upon complex social relations. Transformative
in that it is an ethics that recognises group-based oppres-
sion and produces a form of agency that targets institu-
tions and their practices and may incorporate individual
or collective action to disrupt social or cultural practices.
Second, the 'care of the self' is commonly conceived of in
the absence of the interactional and relational. In his
exposition on the 'care of the self' through the device of
Socrates' conversation with Alchibiades, Murray proposes
an ethics of the 'self' that must go beyond the relationship
of self to self. We are nonetheless left disappointed, as the
promise of a relational ethics following Foucault is not
fully conceived. So what would such a relational ethics
look like? It might, for example, look to Sennet's injunc-
tion to turn outward, to engage in the mistaken recogni-
tion of the other as self and in so doing develop mutuality
and reciprocity as part of an ethics of respect [8]. We might
in a relational ethics of the self follow Bergum and Dosse-
tor in describing relational ethics (in this case in health-
care) as a practice grounded in relationships: in the
specific case of healthcare, the relationships between care
providers and patients, between patients and their fami-
lies, between theorists and practitioners, and even
between the advocates of competing positions and sys-
tems [9]. Bergum and Dossetor argue it is the relationship
itself that supports and informs ethical reflection and
decision making. Much like Socrates of Alchibiades, being
attentive and responsive is the basis of this approach.
Being sensitive to different life circumstances and perspec-
tives of individuals, families and communities is essential.
The core elements of relational ethics are meaningful
interaction, mutual respect, uncertainty and vulnerability
and an interdependent environment. In Sennet's terms,
"the problem we face is how the strong can practice
respect towards those destined to remain weak" (p 119).
Third, the predominant understanding of 'the conduct of
conduct' in governmentality studies is as a technology of
power that is coercive. It is upon this understanding that
Murray draws as he states "While we are thoroughly
beholden to the terms of modern medicine, and while the
self is interpellated as a subject of medical authority, med-
icine continues to sell itself as "self"-empowering." [1].
Such an interpretation of Foucault's governmentality is
common and typically follows Nicolas Rose's conception
of "forms of freedom" in which the individual is "bound
to a regime of subjectification in which subjects are not
merely 'free to choose' but obliged to be free, to under-
stand and enact their lives in terms of choice under condi-
tions that systematically limit the capacity of so many to
shape their own destiny" [10] (p17). This is a powerful
argument for unseating unexpected and counterintuitive
technologies of power (cf, Murtagh and Hepworth [11],
amongst others). It is not, however, sufficient, as I have
previously done myself, to simply regard governmentality
as a constraint on freedom and for the apparent coercion
of the 'conduct of conduct' to be understood as uniformly
negative. Governmentality is a constraint on freedom
only if we insist on understanding freedom in terms of the
individual. Mechanisms of power and power relations are
necessarily local, specific and, if we are to read them
through Foucault's later work, embedded within the
mechanisms of the security of populations [10]. Mecha-
nisms of power have both positive and negative effects;
they constrain, maintain and produce certain ways ofPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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being and living. We need to develop a more nuanced
understandings of the practices of governmentality;
understandings which are themselves not reliant upon
individualistic notions of ethics but rather take account of
individuals in interaction, that is, a governmentality of
and in populations that has both negative and positive
aspirations and effects. Murray's injunction to develop a
Foucauldian ethics holds promise but is limited by its
attachment to the negative paradigm of governmentality.
For Foucault, "Freedom is the ontological condition of
ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom
takes when it is informed by reflection" [6](p. 284). This
considered form need not be voluntaristic and individual-
istic; it need not exclude the relational or interactional; it
is not, as a form of self governance necessarily coercive but
then neither is it necessarily beneficial or beneficent. My
challenge then to Stuart Murray and others (I have to say,
myself included) is to take the argument further; leave us
not with the anticlimax of 'what now?' Give us "some-
thing for everyone"; just not the universal subject.
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